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Bayesian prior predictive analysis of five nested DSGE models suggests that model specifications
and prior distributions tightly circumscribe the range of possible government spending multipliers.
Multipliers are decomposed into wealth and substitution effects, yielding uniform comparisons across
models. By constraining the multiplier to tight ranges, model and prior selections bias results, revealing
less about fiscal effects in data than about the lenses through which researchers choose to interpret
data. When monetary policy actively targets inflation, output multipliers can exceed one, but investment
multipliers are likely to be negative. Passive monetary policy produces consistently strong multipliers
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1 Introduction
Quantitative estimates of ﬁscal multipliers are the nub of the policy and academic debate about
the eﬃcacy of the ﬁscal stimulus packages implemented in response to the recent recession and
ﬁnancial crisis. Estimates vary widely. Government spending multipliers for output range from
−0.26 to well over 1.0 on impact and from below −1.0t oa b o u t1 .40 in the very long run [Davig
and Leeper (2011), Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011), Uhlig (2009, 2010)]. Ranges like these make it
diﬃcult for economists to formulate ﬁscal policy advice.
One active area of research seeks to understand the economic mechanisms underlying the size
of multipliers for unproductive government spending. That work uncovers a long list of important
model features. Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007) and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009) point
to both the fraction of hand-to-mouth (liquidity-constrained or rule-of-thumb) consumers and the
degree of real rigidities. Monacelli and Perotti (2008) highlight wealth eﬀects and nominal rigidi-
ties. Bilbiie (2011) and Monacelli and Perotti (2008) suggest non-separability in preferences over
consumption and leisure. Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) and Uhlig (2010) emphasize distorting
ﬁscal ﬁnancing. And many studies show that monetary policy behavior matters [Kim (2003), Bil-
biie, Meier, and M¨ uller (2008), Eggertsson (2009), Zubairy (2010), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (2011), and Davig and Leeper (2011)].
Two recent meta-studies illustrate the state of the ﬁscal multiplier literature. The meta-studies
employ suites of models that embed a variety of ﬁscal transmission mechanisms and confront sim-
ilar time series data, but draw strikingly diﬀerent conclusions. One study calculates government
spending multipliers for seven structural models and concludes that sizeable short-run output mul-
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tipliers are a robust feature across models [Coenen, Erceg, Freedman, Furceri, Kumhof, Lalonde,
Laxton, Lind´ e, Mourougane, Muir, Mursula, de Resende, Roberts, Roeger, Snudden, Trabandt,
and in’t Veld (2010), hereafter referred to as IMF10/73]. A second study considers a set of models
with many of the same mechanisms as in IMF10/73, but concludes that impact multipliers are sub-
stantially below unity [Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010) and Cwik and Wieland (2011)].
Within the same class of models, Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) estimate short-run multipliers of
one-half and long-run multipliers of about negative one-half.
When closely-related economic models are ﬁt to similar data but yield very diﬀerent estimates
of multipliers, the literature has entered a morass. This paper aims to clear up the morass.
To begin the clariﬁcation process, we examine ﬁscal multipliers from ﬁve nested models: (1)
a simple real business cycle (RBC) model; (2) the RBC model with real frictions added; (3) the
RBC model with nominal rigidities included (a basic new Keynesian model); (4) the new Keynesian
model with hand-to-mouth agents; and (5) the new Keynesian model extended to an open economy.
Our work, like the research cited above, limits attention to unproductive government spending.
In all but the simplest versions of these models, the government spending multiplier is a com-
plicated object: an unknown non-linear function of all the model parameters. Bayesian prior
predictive analysis is a powerful tool to shed light on complicated objects of interest—like the
spending multiplier—that depend on both the joint prior distribution of parameters and the model
speciﬁcation.1
We apply prior predictive analysis sequentially to the nested models to systematically isolate the
aspects of each model speciﬁcation that are important for determining the size of the government
spending multiplier. The analysis yields precise statements about how particular mechanisms
trigger wealth and substitution eﬀects that change the multiplier in models—like those in the
meta-studies—that are rich enough to be empirically relevant.
Model features like wage rigidities, which can ﬂip the sign of the substitution eﬀect created by
higher government spending—from negative to positive—contribute to producing a large multiplier.
Analogously, the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers, who do not factor in the higher future
taxes associated with higher government spending, attenuate negative wealth eﬀects to increase
the multiplier. Although the models can produce output multipliers greater than one, it is diﬃcult
for any of the model speciﬁcations to produce very large multipliers.
The bulk of our results, like most of the existing literature, conditions on a policy regime in
which monetary policy is actively targeting inﬂation and ﬁscal policy is passively adjusting surpluses
to stabilize government debt. Active monetary policy reacts to a persistent ﬁscal expansion and the
attendant increase in inﬂation by sharply raising the nominal policy interest rate. This raises the
real interest rate, which reduces consumption and investment demand to attenuate the stimulative
eﬀects of the ﬁscal expansion. It is not too surprising that in this monetary-ﬁscal regime, very large
ﬁscal multipliers are unlikely.
Since the 2007–2009 recession, many central banks have shifted their emphasis from stabilizing
1Lancaster (2004) and Geweke (2005, 2010) provide textbook treatments.
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inﬂation to stimulating demand by maintaining low and constant policy interest rates—near zero
in some economies. When monetary policy makes the interest rate unresponsive to inﬂation, a
“passive” stance, it ampliﬁes ﬁscal policy’s impacts. By ﬁxing the interest rate, monetary policy
allows higher current and expected inﬂation to transmit into lower real interest rates. Instead of
attenuating the demand stimulus of a ﬁscal expansion, monetary policy ampliﬁes it: lower real
rates encourage greater consumption and investment demand. Lower real rates induce a positive
substitution eﬀect from higher government spending, substantially raising output, consumption,
and investment multipliers. In sharp contrast to the active monetary/passive ﬁscal regime, it is
very diﬃcult to obtain small spending multipliers from the mix of passive monetary/active ﬁscal
policy.
Of course, DSGE models impose economic structure and, therefore, restrictions on data. But
when the model and the prior constrain the ﬁscal multiplier to exceptionally narrow ranges—
even before confronting data—then the studies bias results. Such studies reveal less about the
ﬁscal eﬀects that are embedded in time series data than they do about the lenses through which
researchers choose to interpret the data.
2T h e M o d e l s
Our models share several details with the class of models used to evaluate the size of ﬁscal multi-
pliers: (1) forward-looking, optimizing agents; (2) households who receive utility from consumption
and leisure; (3) production sectors that use capital and labor inputs; (4) monopolistic competition
in the goods and labor sectors; (5) empirically relevant nominal and real frictions; (6) ﬁscal and
monetary authorities who set their instruments using simple feedback rules; and (7) the economy
is at its cashless limit.
Our broadest model, an open economy new Keynesian model similar to Adolfson, Laseen, Lind´ e,
and Villani (2007), nests four models that are commonly used to study ﬁscal multipliers—a basic
Real Business Cycle (RBC) model, an RBC model with real frictions, a standard new Keynesian
(NK) model, and a NK model with nonsavers. We now describe the main model and the restrictions
that deliver the nested models.
The world economy consists of two large countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), with symmetric
preferences. Public and private consumption and investment consist of domestically produced and
imported goods. In the short run, the pass-through of the nominal exchange rate to export and
import prices is incomplete due to local currency pricing.
2.1 Households The economy is populated by a continuum of households on the interval [0,1],
of which a fraction μ are non-savers and a fraction 1 − μ are savers. The superscript S indicates a
variable associated with savers and N with non-savers.
2.1.1 Savers An optimizing representative saver household j derives utility from consumption,
cS
t (j), relative to a habit stock deﬁned in terms of lagged aggregate consumption of savers (θCS
t−1
where θ ∈ [0,1)), and derives disutility from hours worked, lS
t (j):















where β is the discount rate, γ is the household’s risk aversion, and ξ is the inverse of the Frisch
labor elasticity. Savers receive interest income from domestic and international one-period risk free
nominal bond holdings, after tax wage income, after tax rental income from capital, lump sum
transfers from the government ZS, and proﬁts from ﬁrms D. Savers spend income on consumption,
investment in future capital iS, and the domestic and international bonds, BS and FS respectively.
The ﬂow budget constraint for saver j is
P
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Nominal consumption, PCC, is subject to a sales tax τC. PI denotes the price of investment goods,
which potentially diﬀers from consumption goods as they may consist of diﬀerent bundles of traded
and nontraded goods.
Each household j supplies a continuum of diﬀerentiated labor inputs, lS
t (j,l), on the interval
[0,1], which ensures all households have the same labor income in equilibrium. Wt(l) is the nominal
wage rate for labor input l,a n d
  1
0 Wt(l)lS
t (j,l)dl is the total nominal labor income for household
j. Total labor income is taxed at the rate τl.
Savers have access to an international risk-free nominal bond, FS, that pays gross nominal
interest R∗.Γ f(·) is a risk premium on foreign bonds that depends on the net foreign asset















,w h e r est is the real exchange rate, which is deﬁned as the ratio of
consumption prices expressed in the same currency, st ≡ StPC∗
t /PC
t ,a n dSt is the nominal exchange
rate, expressed as the price of one domestic consumption basket in terms of foreign consumption.
Eﬀective capital is related to the physical capital stock ¯ k by ks
t(j)=vt(j)¯ kS
t−1(j), where vt(j)
is the utilization rate of capital. This utilization incurs a cost of Ψ(vt) per unit of physical capital.






as in Smets and Wouters (2003). As ψ → 1, the utilization cost becomes inﬁnite, and the capital
utilization rate becomes constant. Rental income on eﬀective capital is taxed at the rate τk.T h e
law of motion for physical capital is given by
¯ kS













t is an investment adjustment cost, as in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and satisﬁes Γi(1) = s  (1) = 0, and s   (1) ≡ s>0. Investment
costs decrease as s declines.
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2.1.2 Wage Setting and Labor Aggregation Households supply diﬀerentiated labor ser-
vices to the intermediate goods producing ﬁrms. Each diﬀerentiated labor service is supplied by
both savers and non-savers, and demand is uniformly allocated among households. A perfectly
competitive labor packer purchases the diﬀerentiated labor inputs and assembles them to produce
a composite labor service, Lt, according to
Lt =







where ηw is the wage markup. The competitive labor packer’s demand function comes from solving











t is the demand for composite labor services, and Wt is the aggregate nominal wage.
Substantial variation in modeling wage-setting decisions exists in the literature.2 We follow the
approach of assuming savers optimally set their wage while non-savers simply set their wage to
be the average wage of the savers [examples include Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2006) and Forni,
Monteforte, and Sessa (2009)]. Since non-savers face the same labor demand schedule as savers,
they work the same number of hours as the average for savers.
Every period, saver households receive signals to reset their nominal wages for each diﬀerentiated
labor service with probability (1 − ωw). Those who cannot reoptimize partially index their wages to
past inﬂation according to the rule, Wt (l)=Wt−1 (l)π
χw
t−1,w h e r eχw ∈ [0,1] measures the degree
of backward indexation. Savers that receive the signal choose the nominal wage rate Wt (l)t o
maximize their utility. Finally, the nominal aggregate wage evolves according to
Wt =
 

















where   Wt is the optimal nominal wage rate chosen by savers at time t.
2.1.3 Non-savers Non-savers have the same preferences as savers. Non-savers are rule-of-
thumb agents who each period must consume their entire disposable income, which consists of after
tax labor income and lump-sum transfers from the government ZN. The budget constraint for a








t (j)( 4 )
2For example, in whether or not non-savers are allowed to optimally choose their wage and in how wages are
chosen.
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Non-savers nominal consumption PCCN is subject to the same tax rate as savers, τC.N o n - s a v e r s
nominal wage income, WtLN
t also is subject to the same tax rate as savers, τl. Since non-savers
work the same number of hours as the average for savers, and nominal wages are determined by
savers, non-savers consumption is determined by the budget constraint (4).
2.2 Firms and Price Setting
2.2.1 Intermediate Goods Firms Each country consists of a continuum of monopolistically
competitive intermediate goods ﬁrms (indexed by i ∈ [0,1]). These ﬁrms charge diﬀerent prices at
home and abroad, as in Betts and Devereux (1996). In the home market, the demand for ﬁrm i’s
output yH













where ηp > 0, pH
t (i) is the output price in the home market charged by ﬁrm i, Y H
t is aggregate
domestic demand, and PH
t is the aggregate domestic price index. Likewise, in the foreign market,












where mt(i) denotes the foreign quantity demanded of home good i, pH∗
t (i) is the price that ﬁrm
i charges in the foreign market, PH∗
t is the foreign import price index, and M∗
t denotes aggregate
foreign imports.
Each individual ﬁrm i produces with a Cobb-Douglas technology, yt(i)=Atkt(i)αlt(i)1−α,
where α ∈ [0,1]. There are no ﬁxed costs of production, as in Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets,
and Wouters (2004). Firms face perfectly competitive factor markets for capital and labor. Cost
minimization implies that the ﬁrms have identical nominal marginal costs per unit of output, given




Home and foreign prices evolve by a Calvo (1983) mechanism. An intermediate ﬁrm has a
probability of (1 − ωp) each period to reoptimize its price at home and a probability of (1 − ωp,x)
each period to reoptimize its price abroad. Firms that cannot reoptimize partially index their prices





















Firms that are allowed to reoptimize their price in the domestic market in period t maximize
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subject to (5). Analogously, ﬁrms that are allowed to reoptimize their price in the foreign market

















2.2.2 Final Goods Firms Three distinct types of ﬁnal-good ﬁrms combine the domestically
produced and imported intermediate goods to produce the three ﬁnal non-tradable goods: a private
consumption good, a private investment good, and a public consumption good.
The ﬁnal private consumption good QC
t is produced by combining a bundle of domestically-
produced intermediate goods CH




















where μC > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, νC ∈ [0,1] determines
the relative preference a country has for domestic and foreign goods. Home and foreign intermediate
goods bundles combine diﬀerentiated output from each domestic ﬁrm i and foreign ﬁrm i∗ via
CH
t =
















where ηp,η p,x > 0 are related to the intratemporal elasticities of substitution between the diﬀeren-
tiated outputs supplied by the home and foreign intermediate ﬁrms. The consumption ﬁnal good
ﬁrm ﬁrst chooses optimal amounts of each diﬀerentiated output from ﬁrms i and i∗ via cost min-
imization, and then chooses the optimal bundles to maximize proﬁts. Similarly, the ﬁnal private
investment good QI
t and the public consumption good QG










































































2.3 Monetary Policy The monetary authority follows a Taylor-type rule, in which the domes-
tic nominal interest rate Rt responds to its lagged value, the current consumption inﬂation rate,
and current output. We denote a variable in percentage deviations from steady state by a hat. The
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interest rate is set according to
ˆ Rt = ρr ˆ Rt−1 +( 1− ρr)
 
φπˆ πC
t + φy ˆ Yt
 
+  m
t ,  m
t ∼ N(0,1). (12)
2.4 Fiscal Policy Each period the government collects tax revenues from capital, labor, and
consumption taxes, and issues one-period nominal bonds, Bt, to ﬁnance its interest payments and
expenditures, Gt,ZS
t ,ZN
t . The nominal ﬂow government budget constraint is
Bt + τK
t RK
t vtKt−1 + τL
t WtLt + PC
t τC
t Ct = Rt−1Bt−1 + PG




Fiscal rules are simple. They include a response of ﬁscal instruments to the debt-GDP ratio—
to ensure that policies are sustainable—and an autoregressive term to allow for serial correlation.
Fiscal instruments evolve according to the following rules:
ˆ τJ
t = ρJ ˆ τJ
t−1 +( 1− ρJ)γJ ˆ sb
t−1 +  J
t , ˆ τC
t = ρCˆ τC
t−1 +  C
t
ˆ Gt = ρG ˆ Gt−1 − (1 − ρG)γGˆ sb
t−1 +  G
t , ˆ ZQ
t = ρZQ ˆ ZQ
t−1 − (1 − ρZQ)γZQˆ sb
t−1 +  ZQ
t
where J = K,L, Q = S,N and sb
t−1 ≡
Bt−1
Yt−1 ,a n d s
t ∼ i.i.d. N(0,1) for s = {K, L, C, G, ZS, ZN}.
2.5 Resource Constraint and Net Foreign Assets Let Xt denote the aggregate quantity
of a variable xt. Aggregate home consumption is deﬁned as the sum of the two types of household
consumption goods: Ct =
  1
0 ct(j)dj = μCS
t +(1−μ)CN
t . Market clearing in the ﬁnal-good markets
implies QC
t = Ct, QI
t = It+ψ(vt) ¯ Kt−1, QG
t = Gt. The home country’s aggregate resource constraint








t .N e t
foreign assets evolve according to
StFt = R∗




We deﬁne the domestic terms of trade, TOTt, as the ratio between the import price and domestically






2.6 Nested Models The open-economy model is suﬃciently rich to nest a wide range of models
that are commonly used to examine the size of the ﬁscal multiplier. Table 1 lists the speciﬁc
parameter restrictions that deliver each of the ﬁve nested models. Model 1 eliminates all real and
nominal frictions to reduce to a standard RBC closed-economy model. Model 2 allows for real
frictions (investment adjustment costs, habit formation, and capacity utilization) but eliminates
the nominal frictions and the open economy aspects. Model 3 is a standard NK model with sticky
prices and wages, which introduces a role for monetary-ﬁscal policy interactions. Model 4 adds
non-savers to the standard NK model. And model 5 allows for an open-economy structure.3
3We restrict the open-economy model in the text so that the economy does not have access to international ﬁnancial
markets and government spending is completely home-biased. Ours is the open-economy version of the model that
delivers the largest output multipliers. Results from alternative setups with fewer model restrictions appear in the
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Parameter Restrictions
Model 1: Basic RBC ψ =1 ,θ = s = ωw = ωp = ηw = ηp = χw = χp =0
φπ = φy = ρr = μ = νC = νI = νG =0
Model 2: RBC Real Frictions ωw = ωp = ηw = ηp = χw = χp = φπ = φy = ρr =0
μ = νC = νI = νG =0
Model 3: NK Sticky Price & Wage μ = νC = νI = νG =0
Model 4: NK Nonsavers νC = νI = νG =0
Model 5: NK Open Economy νG =0 ,γf =i n f
Table 1: Parameter restrictions on the main model that deliver nested models.
3 Prior Predictive Analysis
While simple DSGE models that permit analytical calculations of the multiplier are important for
building economic intuition (e.g., Woodford (2011), Uhlig (2010)), they cannot be taken to data in
a serious way. Conversely, models that include real and nominal frictions have been shown to ﬁt
data well but are suﬃciently complicated that clean analytics are not available. We echo Geweke
(2010) and Faust and Gupta (2010) in arguing for the use of prior predictive analysis to shed light
on the black-box nature of empirically validated DSGE models. Prior predictive analysis pinpoints
precisely which elements of the model are most important in determining the ﬁscal multiplier
and it delivers the possible range of the multiplier conditional on a speciﬁc model. Most of the
DSGE models that have played a role in the ﬁscal policy debate impose a tight range on the ﬁscal
multiplier, as section 4 shows.
Before describing the prior predictive methodology, we establish some notation. Using the
notation and language of Geweke (2010), a complete model contains four elements:
i. A probability density of observables conditional on unobservables p(yT|θAj,A j)w h e r ej =
1,...,n denotes the number of models under consideration, Aj denotes model j, yT denotes
the vector of random ex ante observable, and θAj are the unobservables. Evaluating this den-
sity at the ex post realized observables (i.e., data) yields the likelihood function L(θAj;yo
T)=
p(yo
T|θAj,A j). For our purposes, this density is given by the log-linearized DSGE model de-
scribed in section 2 and the nested models listed in table 1. The vector θAj denotes the
parameters of the various DSGE models.
ii. A prior density function p(θA,j|Aj), which speciﬁes the range of values and the probabilities
the unobserved parameters take those values. Calibration, which is well known in the macroe-
conomics literature, is an example of a degenerate or dogmatic prior density.
iii. A vector of interest, ω, and its corresponding distribution p(ωT|yT,θ A,j,A j). Our vector of
interest is the ﬁscal multiplier, which we deﬁne formally below. As the conditional distribution
makes explicit, the ﬁscal multiplier will depend on the choice of model (Aj), observables (yT),
and unobservable parameters (θA,j).
appendix.
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iv. A Bayes action or decision, ˆ dT =a r g m a x dTE[U(ωT,d T|yo
T,A j)], which determines the optimal
action and can be cast into the expected utility framework of von Neumann and Morgenstern.




T) ,w h i c hi st h e nu s e dt oo b t a i nt h ep o s t e -




T,θ A,j,A j) p(θA,j|yo
T,A j)dθA,j.
This distribution is then used to calculate the conditional expectation associated with the Bayes
action, ˆ dT.
In the context of ﬁscal multipliers, a Bayes decision might be whether or not to implement
expansionary ﬁscal policy. Debate surrounding the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was
couched in terms of ﬁscal multipliers. Romer and Bernstein (2009) argued that sizeable multipliers
favor a large stimulus. Conditioning on similar data, Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010)
took the opposite view, citing a much smaller multiplier. This paper takes a step back: we ﬁx the
vector of interest to focus exclusively on multipliers but we do not formulate/evaluate a decision
rule. We focus on the importance of steps [i] and [ii] of the model building process, and advocate
using a prior predictive analysis to illuminate how these initial steps may inﬂuence the vector of
interest and, ultimately, the Bayes action that is being considered.






This distribution gives the prior distribution of observables before data is collected. Computation-
ally, it is straightforward and nearly costless to simulate from (14). The algorithm draws from
θ
(m)




Aj ,A j). Drawing sequentially from these distributions deliv-
ers (14) and any function of yT including the vector of interest, ω(m). We use the model speciﬁcation
and a prior distribution to obtain the range of values of the ﬁscal multiplier that the DSGE models
deliver. Because prior predictive analysis gives the entire range of possible multipliers produced by
the model and prior, we can evaluate the model before taking it to data. In the limiting case of
totally uninformative data, the prior predictive becomes the posterior distribution.
In all model speciﬁcations we ﬁx a few parameters whose values are standard in the literature.
The discount factor, β, is set to 0.99 to imply an annual steady-state real interest rate of 4 percent.
The capital income share of total output, α, is set to 0.36, implying a labor income share of 0.64.
The quarterly depreciation rate for private capital, δ, is set to 0.025 so that the annual depreciation
rate is 10 percent. The steady-state inﬂation rate, π,i s1 .
Steady-state ﬁscal variables are calibrated to the values in Traum and Yang (2010), which are
mean values from U.S. data over the period 1983Q1-2008Q1.4 The federal government consumption
4We also adopted priors for these steady-state values and repeated the prior predictive analysis while allowing the
ﬁscal steady-state values to vary. Results in the appendix show that short-run ﬁscal multipliers are largely insensitive
to variations in steady-state ﬁscal parameters, but long-run multipliers are more sensitive.
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to output share is 0.074, the federal debt to annualized output share is 0.386, the average marginal
federal labor tax rate is 0.209, the capital tax rate is 0.196, and ﬁnally, the consumption tax rate
is 0.015.
Table 2 lists the priors used in our analysis and ﬁgure 1 plots the prior distributions for each
parameter. The priors were chosen to cover the range of parameter values considered in the cal-
ibrated exercises of IMF10/73 and Cwik and Wieland (2011). In addition, our priors are similar
to those employed for Bayesian estimation of similar models [examples include Coenen and Straub
(2004), Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009), Lopez-Salido and Rabanal (2006), Leeper, Plante, and
Traum (2010), and Traum and Yang (2010)].
Parameters related to openness are less common in the literature. The prior means of the
substitution elasticity between foreign and domestic private consumption, investment, and govern-
ment spending goods are set to 1.5, as in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and IMF10/73. The
standard deviations are set so that the priors reﬂect a range of values from calibration and estima-
tion exercises. The prior means for the share of imports in private consumption, investment, and
government spending bundles are set to 0.25. Although the risk premium parameter γf is typically
calibrated or ap r i o r iconsidered to be very low, posterior estimates in Adolfson, Laseen, Lind´ e,
and Villani (2007) range from 0.1 to above 0.4. Given the uncertainty around this parameter, we
adopt a uniform prior on the interval 0.0001 to 0.4.
In new Keynesian versions of our model that incorporate both monetary and ﬁscal policies, two
distinct regions of the parameter subspace deliver unique bounded rational expectations equilibria—
an active monetary, passive ﬁscal policy (AM/PF) regime or a passive monetary, active ﬁscal
(PM/AF) policy regime.5 Policy parameter priors in the benchmark speciﬁcation are chosen to
impose the AM/PF regime: the monetary authority raises the interest rate more than one-for-one
with inﬂation to oﬀset inﬂation deviations from target; the ﬁscal authority adjusts expenditures and
tax rates to stabilize debt. The priors do assign a small, non-zero density outside the determinacy
region of the parameter space. However, we restrict the parameter space to the subspace in which
the log-linearized model has a unique bounded rational expectations solution by discarding draws
from the indeterminacy region.
Section 5.2 reports robustness checks in which the distributions of table 2 are replaced with
uniform distributions. Section 6 studies how multipliers change when policies reside in the PM/AF
regime. We take 5,000 draws from our priors and calculate the resulting government spending
multipliers from the prior distributions.
5An active authority is deﬁned as an authority who is not constrained by current budgetary conditions and freely
chooses the decision rule it wants. A passive authority is constrained by the consumers’ and ﬁrms’ optimizations and
by the actions of the active authority. Thus, the passive authority must guarantee that current budgetary conditions
are satisﬁed and, in particular, that the intertemporal government budget constraint holds. See Leeper (1991), Sims
(1994), Cochrane (1998), and Woodford (2003) for more discussion.
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Parameter Prior
func. mean std. 90% int.
Preference and HHs
γ, risk aversion N+ 2 0.6 [1, 3]
ξ, inverse Frisch labor elast. N+ 2 0.6 [1, 3]
θ, habit formation B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83]
μ, fraction of non-savers B 0.3 0.1 [0.14, 0.48]
Frictions
ψ, capital utilization B 0.6 0.15 [0.35, 0.85]
s, investment adj. cost N 6 1.5 [3.5, 8.5]
ωp, domestic price stickiness B 0.5 0.1 [0.34, 0.66]
ωpx, foreign price stickiness B 0.5 0.1 [0.34, 0.66]
ωw, wage stickiness B 0.5 0.1 [0.34, 0.66]
ηp, price mark-up N+ 0.15 0.02 [0.12, 0.18]
ηw, wage mark-up N+ 0.15 0.02 [0.12, 0.18]
χp, domestic price partial indexation B 0.5 0.15 [0.25, 0.75]
χpx, foreign price partial indexation B 0.5 0.15 [0.25, 0.75]
χw, wage partial indexation B 0.5 0.15 [0.25, 0.75]
Openness
νC, consumption import share N+ 0.25 0.07 [0.13, 0.37]
νI, investment import share N+ 0.25 0.07 [0.13, 0.37]
μC, cons. substitution among brands N+ 1.5 0.25 [1.1, 1.9]
μI, invest. substitution among brands N+ 1.5 0.25 [1.1, 1.9]
γf, risk premium U 0.2 0.12 [0.02, 0.38]
Monetary policy
φπ, interest rate resp. to inﬂation N 1.5 0.25 [1.1, 1.8]
φy, interest rate resp. to output N+ 0.15 0.05 [0.07, 0.23]
ρr, lagged interest rate resp. B 0.7 0.2 [0.32, 0.96]
Fiscal policy
γG, govt consumption resp. to debt N+ 0.2 0.05 [0.12, 0.28]
γK, capital tax resp. to debt N+ 0.2 0.05 [0.12, 0.28]
γL, labor tax resp. to debt N+ 0.2 0.05 [0.12, 0.28]
γZS, saver transfers resp. to debt N+ 0.2 0.05 [0.12, 0.28]
γZN, nonsaver transfers resp. to debt N+ 0.2 0.05 [0.12, 0.28]
ρG, lagged govt cons resp. B 0.7 0.2 [0.32, 0.96]
ρK, lagged capital tax resp. B 0.7 0.2 [0.32, 0.96]
ρL, lagged labor tax resp. B 0.7 0.2 [0.32, 0.96]
ρC, lagged cons tax resp. B 0.7 0.2 [0.32, 0.96]
ρZS, lagged saver transfers resp. B 0.7 0.2 [0.32, 0.96]
ρZN, lagged nonsaver transfers resp. B 0.7 0.2 [0.32, 0.96]
Table 2: Prior distributions.
































































































































Figure 1: Prior distributions for parameters.
4 Fiscal Policy Multipliers
Present-value multipliers, which embody the full dynamics associated with exogenous ﬁscal actions
and properly discount future macroeconomic eﬀects, constitute our vector of interest. The present
value of additional output over a k-period horizon produced by an exogenous change in the present


















At k = 0 the present-value multiplier equals the impact multiplier. To compare multipliers across
models, we focus on prior predictive p-values. P-values are the probability of observing a multiplier
ω(θ) greater than a particular value in repeated sampling from the model and prior. Table 3
compares multiplier p-values at various horizons across the ﬁve model speciﬁcations.6 The top
panel of table 3 reports the probability that present-value multipliers for output exceed unity at
various horizons. Middle and lower panels report the probabilities that multipliers for consumption
and investment, respectively, are positive at various horizons. These particular probabilities address
the key issues in the multiplier debate.
Although p-values allow easy comparisons across models, they do not summarize the entire prior
6We approximate the inﬁnite horizon by calculating the present value multipliers over 200 quarters.
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distribution. Figure 2 reveals the prior distribution through the median and 90-percent intervals
for present-value government spending multipliers for output and consumption at various horizons
for models 2, 3, and 4. Consumption multipliers are also decomposed into dynamic Hicksian wealth
and substitution eﬀects, following King (1991) and Baxter (1995).
4.1 Hicksian Decomposition To calculate the dynamic Hicksian wealth and substitution ef-












Let the paths of consumption and labor following a one-percent government spending increase be
denoted by { ˆ Ct, ˆ Lt}∞
















¯ C1−γ(1 − θ)−γ ˆ Ct − θ ¯ C1−γ(1 − θ)−γ ˆ Ct−1 − ¯ L1+ξˆ Lt
 
We then compute the wealth eﬀect as the constant values of consumption and labor such that, at
the initial steady-state prices, present discounted utility equals Utotal; that is, the constant values
of consumption and labor that satisfy8
Utotal =
1
(1 − β)¯ U
 
¯ C1−γ(1 − θ)1−γ ˆ Cwealth − ¯ L1+ξˆ Lwealth
 
(15)
0=ξˆ Lwealth − γ ˆ Cwealth
The consumption substitution eﬀect is then ˆ Csub
t = ˆ Ct − ˆ Cwealth. The substitution eﬀect cap-








t=0 and the initial steady state lifetime utility ¯ U.
Wealth and substitution consumption multipliers come from

































7For models with two agents, we calculate the lifetime utility for each agent.
8For models with sticky wages, we solve a similar set of equations for savers. In this case, we ﬁnd the constant
levels of consumption and wages that satisfy the present value utility constraint, at steady-state labor, and the savers’
ﬁrst-order condition for real wages.
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4.2 Results We start by examining the basic real business cycle model with ﬂexible prices and
complete asset markets (model 1 in table 3). This model is similar to Baxter and King (1993)
and Monacelli and Perotti (2008), with the addition of distortionary ﬁscal ﬁnancing, as in Leeper,
Plante, and Traum (2010). It is impossible for this model to generate output multipliers greater
than one or to produce positive consumption multipliers at any horizon. An unexpected increase in
government expenditures creates a negative wealth eﬀect, as taxes are expected to increase in the
future to ﬁnance the new spending. Agents decrease consumption and work more. These wealth
eﬀects are reinforced by negative substitution eﬀects. Real wages decrease with the increase in
work eﬀorts and the rental cost of capital increases with the rising marginal product of capital.
Consumption and investment are very likely to decrease. These declines in private demand oﬀset
most of the increased public demand, causing output to increase by less than the increase in
government consumption.







1. PV Multiplier: Output








2. PV Multiplier: Consumption







3. PV Multiplier: Consumption (Wealth Effect)









4. PV Multiplier: Consumption (Substitution Effect)
Figure 2: Models 2–4: Present-value government spending multipliers for output and consumption
at various horizons, 90-percent probability bands. Consumption multipliers are decomposed into
components due to wealth and substitution eﬀects. Solid lines: Model 2, RBC model with real
frictions. Dashed lines: Model 3, new Keynesian model with sticky prices and wages. Dotted-
dashed lines: Model 4, new Keynesian model with non-savers.
There is a small probability (< 0.01) that investment will increase at most horizons. This
is the only result consistent across all model speciﬁcations. Any possibility of higher investment






Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
Model 1: Basic RBC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Model 2: RBC Real Frictions 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 <0.01
Model 3: NK Sticky Price & Wage 0.35 0.01 <0.01 0.00 0.00
Model 4: NK Nonsavers 0.88 0.32 0.07 0.02 0.01






Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
Model 1: Basic RBC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Model 2: RBC Real Frictions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 <0.01
Model 3: NK Sticky Price & Wage <0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Model 4: NK Nonsavers 0.84 0.46 0.18 0.02 0.01






Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
Model 1: Basic RBC <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.00
Model 2: RBC Real Frictions <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Model 3: NK Sticky Price & Wage <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.00
Model 4: NK Nonsavers <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.01
Model 5: NK Open Economy <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.01
Table 3: Government spending multiplier probabilities implied by prior predictive analysis with
informative priors.
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stems from a subset of very high draws for ρG, the serial correlation of government spending. As
ρG approaches one, agents view an exogenous change in government spending as approximately
permanent. Permanent increases in government consumption encourage households to save more,
raising investment, a pattern that is robust across model speciﬁcations. In the absence of large
value of ρG, investment would never rise across models.
Model 2 introduces real frictions (habit formation, investment adjustment costs, and capacity
utilization), which substantially aﬀect the short- and long-run multipliers [solid lines in ﬁgure 2].
Now the possible range of multipliers is much larger, especially on the downside. Intuitively, after
government spending rises temporarily, agents are less willing to decrease consumption quickly with
habit formation because changes in consumption are costly and consumption must return to its
steady-state value in the long-run. This implies a more negative consumption multiplier on impact.
Similarly, investment adjustment costs and capacity utilization costs deter large swings in in-
vestment, decreasing the negative investment multipliers.9 Although the multipliers change quan-
titatively relative to model 1, the policy implications from the two models are virtually the same,
as the probabilities reported in table 3 are unaltered.
Model 3 introduces sticky prices and sticky wages, which increase multipliers at all horizons,
as Woodford (2011) shows analytically. Greater price stickiness means that more ﬁrms respond
to higher government spending by increasing production rather than prices, so markups respond
more strongly. In the long run, the 90-percent interval for present value output multipliers includes
positive values [dashed lines of panel 1 of ﬁgure 2]. RBC models cannot produce these positive long-
run multipliers; nominal rigidities, as in new Keynesian-style models, are necessary for spending
increases to persistently raise output.
Wage rigidities have a strong eﬀect on consumption multipliers. Sticky wages can reverse the
sign of the substitution eﬀect on consumption [compare dashed to solid lines in ﬁgure 2]. Positive
substitution eﬀects can arise because real wages may increase to oﬀset other price eﬀects that
generate negative substitution eﬀects.
Non-savers (model 4) raise ﬁscal multipliers substantially. The fraction of non-savers is the
most inﬂuential parameter for the output multiplier, as variations in this parameter are necessary
to get median impact output multipliers greater than one (the dotted-dashed lines of panel 1 of
ﬁgure 2). Unlike savers, non-savers ignore the wealth eﬀects of future taxes, so they increase their
consumption when government consumption rises. Non-savers consume their entire income each
period and do not take into account the negative wealth eﬀects that savers consider, reducing the
negative wealth eﬀect on consumption [panel 3]. If wages are sticky, so that real wages increase
on impact, then non-saver consumption increases as well. With enough non-savers in the economy,
the increase in non-saver consumption can be large enough to cause total consumption to increase
on impact (the dotted-dashed lines of panel 2 of ﬁgure 2), leading to larger output multipliers as
well.
9See Monacelli and Perotti (2008) for a more detailed examination of the eﬀect of habit formation and investment
adjustment costs on multipliers in a simple RBC model.
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The open-economy framework (model 5), reduces the probabilities both of output multipliers
being greater than one and of positive consumption multipliers. In the open economy, increases
in government expenditures induce substitution away from domestically-produced goods towards
imported goods. Higher demand raises production costs, increasing prices of domestic goods and
of domestic goods in the foreign market. Domestic households, in turn, reduce their demand for
domestic production and increase demand for imports. Foreigners also reduce their demand for
domestic exports. This import-substitution eﬀect makes output multipliers smaller on average than
they are in the closed economy.
Model 5 imposes ﬁnancial autarky, which tends to raise short-run multipliers in an open econ-
omy. Because trade in goods must be balanced each period, the import substitution eﬀect is
smaller, with nominal imports constrained to equal exports. Multipliers are smaller with interna-
tional ﬁnancial integration. Financial integration allows the domestic economy to run trade deﬁcits
and consume more imports, causing output to decrease more in the short run. Multipliers also are
smaller when government spending is a traded good, as part of the increase in government spending
goes directly to the foreign country.10 Impact consumption multipliers decrease by half in an open
economy with a traded government spending good, as compared to the closed-economy setting.
These results help explain some of the diﬀerences in multipliers between IMF10/73 and Cwik and
Wieland (2011), as the open-economy models in those meta-studies make diﬀerent assumptions
about the nature of openness.
4.3 Summary Looking across the speciﬁcations, a few observations emerge. First, real and
nominal frictions, non-savers, and open economy considerations quantitatively alter multipliers.
Nominal rigidities and non-savers are critical to generate positive long-run output multipliers.
Although the broadest model can produce output multipliers greater than one, it is diﬃcult for
that model to produce substantially large multipliers. A closed economy with non-savers produces
the largest impact output multipliers, with a 90-percent interval from 0.84 to 1.75. This suggests
that it is hard, even for this model, to generate multipliers greater than 2.
5 Digging Deeper
We now turn to more detailed analyses. This section isolates the contributions of individual pa-
rameters to multipliers and examines the inﬂuence of priors.
5.1 Individual Parameter Contributions So far the analysis has largely ignored the eﬀect
a particular parameter has on present-value multipliers. To determine how much individual param-
eters aﬀect the multipliers, we calculate a measure of root mean square deviation (RMSD) for each
parameter. For each draw of parameters, ˜ θ =[ ˜ θ1 ... ˜ θn]  from p(θ), we calculate multipliers ˜ ω(˜ θ).
Redeﬁne the parameter vector when the ith parameter is ﬁxed at its prior mean, E[θi]. Denote that
vector by ˜ θi =[ ˜ θ1 ... E[θi] ... ˜ θn]  and calculate the multipliers, ˜ ωi(˜ θi). Repeat this for each
10Results for these cases are reported in the appendix.
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i =1 ,2,...n. The RMSD is the root mean square deviation between the two multipliers ˜ ω(˜ θ)a n d
˜ ωi(˜ θi): it measures how much the multiplier varies on average due to parameter i. The RMSD is
largest for the parameters that are most inﬂuential for the multiplier. Tables 4 and 5 report the
fraction of total RMSDs of multipliers attributable to each parameter in the open economy new
Keynesian model (model 5) at various horizons.
The fraction of non-savers, μ,i sthe most inﬂuential parameter on the output and consumption
impact multipliers. Non-savers consume their entire income each period and do not take into
account the negative wealth eﬀects that savers consider. If real wages increase on impact, then
non-saver consumption and, therefore, output increase as well.11 This fraction accounts for 19
percent of the output multiplier (table 4) and 28 percent of the consumption multiplier (table 5)
on impact. The fraction of non-savers is not particularly important for long-run multipliers.
Persistence of the government spending process, governed by ρG, is the second most important
parameter for impact multipliers. The greater the persistence, the larger are the negative wealth
eﬀects because larger increases in taxes are required to ﬁnance the increase in the government
spending process. Persistence accounts for 19 and 16 percent of the output and consumption
multipliers on impact. The inﬂuence of ρG grows over time to explain about 30 percent of multipliers
in the long run.
Habit formation, θ, and capacity utilization cost, ψ, parameters are also important for impact
multipliers. As habit formation increases, households value consumption smoothing more, which
dampens the variation in consumption (and thus output) over time. Capacity utilization costs
matter for output multipliers, as our measure of output depends directly on the utilization rate.
Impact multipliers are increasing with risk aversion γ, as Monacelli and Perotti (2008) note.
Higher risk aversion (or smaller intertemporal elasticity of substitution), makes households less
willing to postpone consumption into the future. This decreases the variation of consumption
and output following government spending changes. Consumption multipliers are substantially
inﬂuenced by the risk aversion parameter in the short and long runs [table 5].
Monetary policy also inﬂuences multipliers. As Woodford (2011) and IMF10/73 note, the more
accommodative monetary policy is, the larger the multipliers are. Multipliers are decreasing in
φπ and φy and increasing in ρr. Variation in ρr is particularly important, accounting for about
10 percent of impact multipliers. Changes in ρr directly aﬀect the persistence of real interest
rates following a government spending expansion. Real rates, in turn, have important impacts on
present-value calculations.
5.2 Influence of Priors Our priors are informative and inﬂuence the distribution of mul-
tipliers implied by the model speciﬁcations. To show the sensitivity of multipliers to the priors,
we calculate multipliers conditional on diﬀuse, uniform priors [table 6]. Table 7 reports multiplier
p-values at various horizons for the model speciﬁcations when the uniform priors are employed.
11As noted in Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007), non-savers are vital for multipliers when coupled with nominal
wage rigidities. The appendix details how non-savers have no substantial impact on multipliers when the labor market
is perfectly competitive.
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Parameter RMSD PV ΔY
ΔG
Impact 4 qtrs. 10 qtrs. 25 qtrs. ∞
Preference and HHs
γ, risk aversion 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04
ξ, inverse Frisch labor elast. 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06
θ, habit formation 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02
μ, fraction of non-savers 0.19 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.04
Frictions and Production
ψ, capital utilization 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.04
s, investment adjust. cost 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03
ωp, domestic price stickiness 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
ωpx, foreign price stickiness 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ωw, wage stickiness 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
ηp, price mark-up 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ηw, wage mark-up 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
χp, domestic price partial indexation 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
χpx, foreign price partial indexation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
χw, wage partial indexation 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Openness
νC, cons. import share 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
νI, inv. import share 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
μC, cons. substitution among brands 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
μI, inv. substitution among brands 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monetary Policy
φπ, interest rate resp. to inﬂation 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
φy, interest rate resp. to output 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02
ρr, lagged interest rate resp. 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07
Fiscal Policy
γG, govt consumption resp. to debt 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
γK, capital tax resp. to debt 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02
γL, labor tax resp. to debt 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
γZS, saver transfer resp. to debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04
γZN, nonsaver transfer resp. to debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
ρG, lagged govt cons resp. 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.29 0.30
ρK, lagged capital tax resp. 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01
ρL, lagged labor tax resp. 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01
ρC, lagged cons tax resp. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ρZS, lagged saver transfer resp. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
ρZN, lagged nonsaver transfer resp. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Table 4: RMSDs for model 5, New Keynesian open economy model. Columns may not sum to 1.0
due to rounding.
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Parameter RMSD PV ΔC
ΔG
Impact 4 qtrs. 10 qtrs. 25 qtrs. ∞
Preference and HHs
γ, risk aversion 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.08
ξ, inverse Frisch labor elast. 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06
θ, habit formation 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.02
μ, fraction of non-savers 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.07 0.04
Frictions and Production
ψ, capital utilization 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01
s, investment adjust. cost 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
ωp, domestic price stickiness 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ωpx, foreign price stickiness 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ωw, wage stickiness 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
ηp, price mark-up 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
ηw, wage mark-up 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
χp, domestic price partial indexation 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
χpx, foreign price partial indexation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
χw, wage partial indexation 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Openness
νC, cons. import share 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
νI, inv. import share 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
μC, cons. substitution among brands 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
μI, inv. substitution among brands 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Monetary Policy
φπ, interest rate resp. to inﬂation 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
φy, interest rate resp. to output 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
ρr, lagged interest rate resp. 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Fiscal Policy
γG, govt consumption resp. to debt 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
γK, capital tax resp. to debt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
γL, labor tax resp. to debt 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.03
γZS, saver transfer resp. to debt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
γZN, nonsaver transfer resp. to debt 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01
ρG, lagged govt cons resp. 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.28
ρK, lagged capital tax resp. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
ρL, lagged labor tax resp. 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.02
ρC, lagged cons tax resp. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ρZS, lagged saver transfer resp. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
ρZN, lagged nonsaver transfer resp. 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00
Table 5: RMSDs for model 5, new Keynesian open economy model. Columns may not sum to 1.0
due to rounding.
21Leeper, Traum & Walker: Fiscal Multiplier Morass
Uniform priors increase the probability of parameter draws from a larger region of the parameter
space. This, in turn, allows a larger range of multipliers and increases the probabilities of output
multipliers greater than one and of positive consumption and investment multipliers. Comparing
the probabilities under the two sets of prior distributions reveals that the prior speciﬁcation is most
informative about multipliers over longer horizons. However, model speciﬁcations often still imply
tight multiplier ranges, and the general conclusions reported above still hold. It remains diﬃcult
to generate positive investment multipliers over any horizon. In addition, nominal rigidities and
non-savers remain critical to achieving positive long-run output multipliers.
6 Alternative Fiscal-Monetary Regimes
All the work reported above maintains the assumption that monetary policy actively targets inﬂa-
tion. Prior distributions place either minuscule (table 2) or zero (table 6) probability on monetary
policy responding less than one-for-one to inﬂation (φπ < 1). With central banks operating at
or near the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates in recent years, it is useful to compute
ﬁscal multipliers in a regime with passive monetary policy and active ﬁscal policy. Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Davig and Leeper (2011) both ﬁnd that this alternative policy
regime can produce substantially larger government spending multipliers.
To explore how the multipliers depend on the ﬁscal-monetary speciﬁcation, we calculate mul-
tipliers conditional on model 5 (the open economy new Keynesian model) in a passive monetary
and active ﬁscal (PM/AF) policy regime. In this speciﬁcation, the monetary authority raises the
interest rate less than one-for-one with inﬂation deviations from target, and the ﬁscal authority
does not adjust ﬁscal instruments suﬃciently to stabilize debt. To ensure this, we modify our priors
by assuming φπ has a uniform distribution on the unit interval, and γg, γk, γl, γzs,a n dγzn have
normal distributions with zero means and standard deviations of 0.03. As above, we ensure that
each parameter draw delivers a unique bounded rational expectations equilibrium.
Table 8 reports multiplier p-values at various horizons conditional on the PM/AF regime. The
multiplier probabilities change drastically: it is impossible in the short run for output multipliers to
be less than one and for consumption multipliers to be negative [non-uniform prior lines in the table].
In addition, the probability of positive investment multipliers is substantial at all horizons. Figure
3 compares multipliers in the open economy model for the benchmark active monetary/passive
ﬁscal, AM/PF, (dotted lines) and the alternative PM/AF (solid lines) regimes.
A persistent increase in government consumption raises current and future demand, as well as
current and expected inﬂation. Under passive monetary policy, the monetary authority responds to
the increase in inﬂation less than one-for-one, which allows the real interest rate to fall. Declining
real interest rates lower the return to saving, encouraging households to increase consumption and
leading to positive substitution eﬀects. Higher private demand, coupled with a lower rental cost of
capital, encourages ﬁrms to demand more capital and investment rises on impact in most cases.
A uniform prior on all the parameters somewhat attenuates these large government spending
impacts. Although output multipliers are still likely to exceed unity and consumption multipliers




γ, risk aversion U [0, 6]
ξ, inverse Frisch labor elast. U [0, 6]
θ, habit formation U [0, 1]
μ, fraction of non-savers U [0, 0.6]
Frictions
ψ, capital utilization U [0, 1]
s, investment adj. cost U [0, 10]
ωp, domestic price stickiness U [0, 1]
ωpx, foreign price stickiness U [0, 1]
ωw, wage stickiness U [0, 1]
ηp, price mark-up U [0, 0.5]
ηw,w a g em a r k - u p U [ 0 ,0 . 5 ]
χp, domestic price partial indexation U [0, 1]
χpx, foreign price partial indexation U [0, 1]
χw, wage partial indexation U [0, 1]
Openness
νC, consumption import share U [0, 1]
νI, investment import share U [0, 1]
μC, cons. substitution among brands U [1, 4]
μI, invest. substitution among brands U [1, 4]
γf, risk premium U [0.0001, 0.4]
Monetary policy
φπ, interest rate resp. to inﬂation U [1, 4]
φy, interest rate resp. to output U [0, 0.5]
ρr, lagged interest rate resp. U [0, 1]
Fiscal policy
γG, govt consumption resp. to debt U [0, 0.5]
γK, capital tax resp. to debt U [0, 0.5]
γL, labor tax resp. to debt U [0, 0.5]
γZS, saver transfers resp. to debt U [0, 0.5]
γZN, nonsaver transfers resp. to debt U [0, 0.5]
ρG, lagged govt cons resp. U [0, 1]
ρK, lagged capital tax resp. U [0, 1]
ρL, lagged labor tax resp. U [0, 1]
ρC, lagged cons tax resp. U [0, 1]
ρZS, lagged saver transfers resp. U [0, 1]
ρZN, lagged nonsaver transfers resp. U [0, 1]
Table 6: Uniform Prior distributions.






Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
Model 1: Basic RBC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Model 2: RBC Real Frictions 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.13
Model 3: NK Sticky Price & Wage 0.43 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.10
Model 4: NK Nonsavers 0.76 0.46 0.26 0.20 0.20






Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
Model 1: Basic RBC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Model 2: RBC Real Frictions 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.11
Model 3: NK Sticky Price & Wage 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07
Model 4: NK Nonsavers 0.73 0.57 0.32 0.15 0.15






Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
Model 1: Basic RBC 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Model 2: RBC Real Frictions 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.11
Model 3: NK Sticky Price & Wage 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09
Model 4: NK Nonsavers 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.22 0.27
Model 5: NK Open Economy 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.27 0.33
Table 7: Government spending multiplier probabilities implied by prior predictive analysis with
uniform priors.






Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
Non-uniform prior 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.91






Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
Non-uniform prior 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.93






Impact 4 quart. 10 quart. 25 quart. ∞
Non-uniform prior 0.73 0.53 0.45 0.44 0.47
Uniform prior 0.31 0.30 0.35 0.41 0.45
Table 8: Government spending multiplier probabilities implied by prior predictive analysis for
Model 5 (open economy model) with passive monetary-active ﬁscal policies.
remain likely to be positive, there is now substantial probability mass on negative investment
multipliers [uniform prior lines in table].
The results highlight the importance of ﬁscal-monetary interactions for policy conclusions. Al-
though the results diﬀer substantially from the benchmark policy regime speciﬁcation, it is impor-
tant to note that the PM/AF speciﬁcation also imposes a tight multiplier range. But in this case,
it is a tight range of large multipliers.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown, through prior predictive analysis, that many model speciﬁcations impose a
very tight range for the multiplier even before the models are taken to data. Although multipliers
vary substantially across various monetary-ﬁscal policy speciﬁcations, conditional on a particular
policy regime, a model still imposes a tight range for multipliers. The results raise a warning ﬂag
for policymakers who base decisions on the ﬁscal multipliers from particular calibrated or estimated
models. The tight multiplier ranges that models and priors impose before conditioning on data
biases results and may shed little light on the size of multipliers in time series data.
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Figure 3: Present-value government spending multipliers for output and consumption at various
horizons, 90-percent probability bands. Consumption multipliers are decomposed into compo-
nents due to wealth and substitution eﬀects. Solid lines: Open economy model under the pas-
sive monetary-active ﬁscal policy regime. Dashed lines: Open economy model under the active
monetary-passive ﬁscal policy regime.
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Appendix for On-Line Publication
This appendix gives details on the log-linear approximation of the model, additional details
on the calculations of the Hicksian decompositions, and some additional results not included in
the main text. In particular, the additional results include: 1) ranges of present value multipliers
from the non-uniform prior analysis under various model speciﬁcations, 2) ranges of present value
multipliers from the uniform prior analysis under various model speciﬁcations, 3) ranges of present
value multipliers from additional model speciﬁcations under the passive monetary, active ﬁscal
policy regime, 4) model comparison analysis, and 5) ranges of present value multipliers based on an
alternative ordering of the models presented in the main text. This appendix is not self-contained
and assumes the reader is familiar with the contents of the main text.
A Derivation of the Log-Linearized Model
A.1 The Equilibrium System.
A.1.1 Households We deﬁne ΛS




t . In addition, we deﬁne λS
t qt as the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the capital accumulation equation, and wt ≡ Wt/PC




Savers’ FOC for consumption:
λS






























where st is the real exchange rate. Savers’ FOC for capacity utilization:
(1 − τk
t )rk
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Kt = vt ¯ Kt−1 (22)
Law of motion for capital:








Nonsavers’ real budget constraint:
(1 + τc
t )CN
t =( 1− τL
t )wtLt + ZN
t (24)










































































































Real marginal cost (≡ MCt/PC
t ):
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Demand for the domestically produced and imported intermediate goods i and i∗ by the ﬁnal
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Demand for the domestically produced and imported intermediate good bundles by the ﬁnal private
consumption good ﬁrm:
CH




















t =[ ( 1− νC)(PH














































Demand for the domestically produced and imported intermediate good bundles by the ﬁnal private
investment good ﬁrm:
IH




















t =[ ( 1− νI)(PH
















































Demand for the domestically produced and imported intermediate good bundles by the ﬁnal public
consumption good ﬁrm:
GH
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where
PG
t =[ ( 1− νG)(PH




Note that aggregating across the three ﬁnal-goods ﬁrms gives the aggregate demand for the domes-
tically produced and imported intermediate goods i and i∗:
Y H










































t vtKt−1 + τL














A.1.6 Aggregation. Aggregation of household consumption:
Ct = μCS
t +( 1− μ)CN
t (50)
Market clearing in ﬁnal consumption good market:
QC
t = Ct (51)
Market clearing in ﬁnal investment good market:
QI
t = It + ψ(vt) ¯ Kt−1 (52)
Market clearing in ﬁnal government spending good market:
QG
t = Gt (53)
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A.2 Steady State. By assumption, in steady state v =1 ,ψ(1) = 0, Γi(1) = Γ 
i(1) = 0. In
addition, we assume that πC = 1, implying R =1 /β and s = 1. We normalize the relative home
and foreign import price and set pF = pH∗ = 1. This implies that all other relative prices are equal
to one as well.
rk =
1 − β(1 − δ)
β(1 − τK)



































=1− sG − δ
K
Y











where sB = b


































































w(1 − τL)(1 − θ)−γ




 −ξ  
CS
Y
 −γ  1
γ+ξ
Given Y , the levels of all other steady state variables can be backed out.
A.3 The Log-Linearized System.














Euler equation for domestic bonds:
ˆ λS
t = ˆ Rt + Etˆ λS
t+1 − Etˆ πC
t+1 (58)
Euler equation for foreign bonds:
ˆ λS
t = ˆ R∗
t + Etˆ λS
t+1 + Etˆ st+1 − ˆ st − Etˆ πC∗
t+1 − ζˆ zt
where zt ≡ stFt
Yt . Combining the two bond Euler equations leads to the uncovered interest parity
condition:
ˆ Rt − ˆ R∗
t = Etˆ st+1 − ˆ st + Etˆ πC
t+1 − Etˆ πC∗
t+1 − ζˆ zt (59)








ˆ vt +ˆ pI
t (60)
where ˆ pI
t ≡ ˆ PI
t − ˆ PC
t is the relative price, with respect to the home consumption basket, of home
investment. Household FOC for capital:
ˆ qt = Etˆ λS
t+1 − ˆ λS
t + β(1 − τK)rkEtˆ rk
t+1 − βτKrkEtˆ τK
t+1 + β(1 − δ)Etˆ qt+1 (61)




t +( 1+β)ˆ It −
1
s
ˆ qt − βEtˆ It+1 = ˆ It−1 (62)
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Eﬀective capital:
ˆ Kt =ˆ vt + ˆ ¯ Kt−1 (63)
Law of motion for capital:
ˆ ¯ Kt =( 1− δ) ˆ ¯ Kt−1 + δˆ It (64)
Nonsavers’ real budget constraint:
τCCNˆ τC
t +( 1+τC)CN ˆ CN
t =( 1− τL)wL[ˆ wt + ˆ Lt] − τLwLˆ τL
t + ZN ˆ ZN
t (65)










  s  
k=1
{χwˆ πC
t+k−1 − ˆ πC
t+k} + ˆ λS
t+s −
τL










ηw [ ˆ ˜ wt − ˆ wt+s]
 







ˆ ˜ wt = ξˆ Lt − ˆ λS
t +
τL
















Et( ˆ ˜ wt+1 − χwˆ πC
t +ˆ πC
t+1)
Log-linearizing equation (27)l e a d st o
ˆ wt =( 1− ωw) ˆ ˜ wt + ωw(ˆ wt−1 + χwˆ πC
t−1 − ˆ πC
t )






















ˆ wt − ξˆ Lt −
τL
1 − τL ˆ τL
t + ˆ λS
t
  (66)
where κw ≡ (1 − βωw)(1 − ωw)/[ωw(1 + β)(1 + ξ(1 + 1
ηw))].
A.3.3 Intermediate Goods Firms. Production function:
ˆ Yt = ˆ At + α ˆ Kt +( 1− α)ˆ Lt (67)
Capital-labor ratio:
ˆ rk
t − ˆ wt = ˆ Lt − ˆ Kt (68)
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Marginal cost:
ˆ mct = αˆ rk
t +( 1− α)ˆ wt − ˆ At (69)








t − ˆ PH
t
 
− ˆ mct+s − ˆ PC





t+k−1 − ˆ πH
t+k]
 





t − ˆ PH
t
 
=ˆ mct + ˆ PC
























t−1 − ˆ πH
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t ≡ ˆ PH
t − ˆ PC
t and κp ≡ [(1 − βωp)(1 − ωp)]/[ωp(1 + βχp)]. Similarly, from log-linearizing

















t ≡ ˆ PH∗
t − ˆ PC∗
t and κp,x ≡ [(1 − βωp,x)(1 − ωp,x)]/[ωp,x(1 + βχp,x)].
A.3.4 Final Goods Firms. Combining equations (35)a n d( 51) gives the ﬁnal consumption
good technology:
ˆ Ct =( 1− νC) ˆ CH
t + νC ˆ CF
t (72)
Consumption price index, from equation (38):
(1 − νC)ˆ pH
t + νCˆ pF
t = 0 (73)
Home demand for imported consumption, from equation (37):
ˆ CF
t = μCˆ pF
t + ˆ Ct (74)




ˆ vt =( 1− νI)ˆ IH
t + νI ˆ IF
t (75)
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Investment price index, from equation (42):
(1 − νI)ˆ pH
t + νIˆ pF
t =ˆ pI
t (76)
Home demand for imported investment, from equation (41):
ˆ IF
t = μIˆ pF




Combining equations (43)a n d( 53) gives the ﬁnal government spending technology:
ˆ Gt =( 1− νG) ˆ GH
t + νG ˆ GF
t (78)
Government spending price index, from equation (46):
(1 − νG)ˆ pH
t + νGˆ pF
t =ˆ pG
t (79)
Home demand for imported government spending, from equation (45):
ˆ GF
t = μGˆ pF
t + ˆ Gt (80)




t − ˆ pH
t−1 (81)




t − ˆ pH∗
t−1 (82)
A.3.5 Policy. Government budget constraint:
Rb( ˆ Rt−1 +ˆ bt−1 − ˆ πC
t )+G( ˆ Gt +ˆ pG
t )+ZS ˆ ZS
t + ZN ˆ ZN
t
= bˆ bt + τKrKK(ˆ τK
t +ˆ rK
t + ˆ Kt)+τLwL(ˆ τL
t +ˆ wt + ˆ Lt)+τCC(ˆ τC
t + ˆ Ct)
(83)
where ˆ pG
t ≡ ˆ PG
t − ˆ PC
t .
A.3.6 Aggregation. Aggregation of household consumption:
C ˆ Ct = CS(1 − μ) ˆ CS
t + CNμ ˆ CN
t (84)
Home aggregate resource constraint:
Y ˆ Yt = CH ˆ CH
t + IH ˆ IH
t + GH ˆ GH
t + M∗ ˆ M∗
t (85)
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Home imports:
M ˆ Mt = CF ˆ CF
t + IF ˆ IF
t + GF ˆ GF
t (86)
Net foreign asset evolution:
Y ˆ zt = R∗Y ˆ zt−1 + M∗(ˆ st +ˆ pH∗
t + ˆ M∗
t ) − M(ˆ pF
t + ˆ Mt) (87)
B Hicksian Decompositions Details
B.1 Sticky Wages To calculate the dynamic Hicksian wealth and substitution eﬀects, we ﬁrst













Let the paths of consumption and labor following a one-percent government spending increase be
denoted by { ˆ Ct, ˆ Lt}∞









¯ C1−γ(1 − θ)−γ ˆ Ct − θ ¯ C1−γ(1 − θ)−γ ˆ Ct−1 − ¯ L1+ξˆ Lt
 
(89)
The wealth eﬀect is computed as the constant values of consumption and nominal wages such that,
at the initial steady-state prices and steady-state labor, present discounted utility equals Utotal.12
That is, the constant values of consumption and nominal wages { ˆ Cwealth, ˆ ˜ Wwealth} that satisfy
Utotal =
1
(1 − β)¯ U
 
¯ C1−γ(1 − θ)1−γ ˆ Cwealth
 
(90)
0= ˆ ˜ Wwealth − γ ˆ Cwealth (91)
The consumption substitution eﬀect is then
ˆ Csub
t = ˆ Ct − ˆ Cwealth (92)
Wealth and substitution consumption multipliers are calculated as


































12We compute it as constant values of consumption and wages because, in the sticky wage setup, the choice variable
for the household is the nominal wage rate.
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B.2 Two Household Models To calculate the dynamic Hicksian wealth and substitution
eﬀects when both savers and non-savers are present in the model, we ﬁrst calculate the wealth and
substitution eﬀects for savers as outlined above. Since non-savers do not have a wage rate or labor-
leisure decision,13 their consumption simply moves one-for-one with changes in their disposable
income. As such, any change in consumption is due entirely to per-period income (wealth) eﬀects,
so that ˆ CN
t =( CN
t )wealth and (CN
t )sub =0 .
Total consumption wealth and substitution eﬀects then are calculated as
Cwealth



















Wealth and substitution consumption multipliers are calculated as before:



































C.1 Various Model Multipliers Tables 9, 10,a n d11 list the median and 95% intervals for
present value output, consumption, and investment multipliers, respectively, generated using the
non-uniform priors (Refer to table 2 in the main text for the prior distributions). Several additional
model speciﬁcations are considered in addition to the ﬁve models in the main text. Details of each
model speciﬁcation are listed below.
• RBC Lump-Sum Finance: basic real business cycle model with ﬂexible prices, as in Baxter
and King (1993).
• RBC Labor Tax Finance: basic real business cycle model with ﬂexible prices and distortionary
labor taxes adjusting to ﬁnance debt, similar to ?.
• RBC Distortionary Finance: Model 1 in the main text. Basic real business cycle model with
ﬂexible prices and government spending, lump-sum transfers, distortionary labor and capital
taxes all adjusting to ﬁnance debt, similar to Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010).
• RBC B
Y Varies: Same speciﬁcation as RBC Distortionary Finance, additionally allowing a
prior on the value for the steady state debt to gdp ratio.
13We assume non-savers simply set their wage to be the average wage of the savers. Since non-savers face the same
labor demand schedule as savers, they work the same number of hours as the average for savers.
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• RBC Fiscal Steady State Varies: Same speciﬁcation as RBC Distortionary Finance, addition-
ally allowing priors on all steady state ﬁscal values.
• RBC Real Frictions: Model 2 in the main text. Introduces real frictions (habit formation,
investment adjustment costs, and capacity utilization) to the RBC Distortionary Finance
model.
• NK Sticky Price: basic New Keynesian model with sticky prices and ﬂexible wages.
• NK Sticky Price & Wage: Model 3 in the main text. New Keynesian model with sticky prices
and sticky wages.
• NK Nonsavers: Model 4 in the main text. Introduces non-savers to the NK Sticky Price &
Wage model.
• Open NK Fin. Autarky: G NonTraded: Model 5 in the main text. Introduces open economy
features by considering a two-country world economy and allowing consumption and invest-
ment to consist of domestic and imported goods. Under ﬁnancial autarky, there is no trade
in assets, and the home and foreign countries experiences balanced trade each period.
• Open NK Fin. Autarky: G Traded: Allows government spending to consist of both domestic
and imported goods in the ﬁnancial autarky version of the open economy model.
• Open NK Fin. Integration: G NonTraded: Introduces open economy features by considering
a two-country world economy and allowing consumption and investment to consist of domestic
and imported goods. With ﬁnancial integration, we allow the home country to borrow/lend
internationally with a risk-free bond, and subject the home country to a risk premium that
depends on the net foreign asset position.
• Open NK Fin. Integration: G Traded: Allows government spending to consist of both
domestic and imported goods in the ﬁnancial integration version of the open economy model.
Looking across model speciﬁcations, several trends emerge. Over time, distortionary ﬁnancing
creates costly disincentive eﬀects as labor and capital taxes increase, causing output multipliers
to double in the long run, compared to a model with only lump-sum tax adjustments (comparing
r o w s1 - 3i nt a b l e s9, 10,a n d11). Allowing multiple distortionary instruments to adjust to debt
substantially increases the long run negative output multipliers. Most research on ﬁscal multipliers
only allows one ﬁscal instrument to adjust to debt at a time,14 suggesting these works might be
biased towards higher long run multipliers if multiple types of expenditures and taxes adjust to
debt in practice.
14Indeed, following Uhlig (2010) and Coenen, Erceg, Freedman, Furceri, Kumhof, Lalonde, Laxton, Lind´ e,
Mourougane, Muir, Mursula, de Resende, Roberts, Roeger, Snudden, Trabandt, and in’t Veld (2010), a common
practice in the literature is to allow labor taxes to adjust to debt.
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Short-run ﬁscal multipliers are largely insensitive to variations in steady-state ﬁscal parameters
(rows 4 and 5 in tables 9, 10,a n d11). However, long-run multipliers are more sensitive to the
steady-state ﬁscal values, suggesting long-run present value multipliers produced from the model
in IMF10/73 may vary from diﬀerences in steady state calibrations across models.
Looking across the various open economy speciﬁcations (the last four rows in tables 9, 10,
and 11), it appears the open economy model in the main text (Model 5) delivers the largest
output multipliers. Multipliers are smaller with international ﬁnancial integration. Under ﬁnancial
autarky, trade in goods must be balanced each period. This decreases the import substitution
eﬀect, as nominal imports are constrained to equal exports. With ﬁnancial integration, the domestic
economy initially runs trade deﬁcits and consumes more imports, causing output to decrease more
in the short run. Multipliers also are smaller when government spending is a traded good, as part
of the increase in government spending goes directly to the foreign country.
Tables 12, 13,a n d14 list the median and 95% intervals for present value output, consumption,
and investment multipliers, respectively, generated using the uniform priors (Refer to table 6 in
the main text for the prior distributions). Looking across model speciﬁcations, we see that model
restrictions impose the same restrictions on multipliers generated with non-uniform or uniform
priors. The uniform priors increase the probability of parameter draws from a larger region of the
parameter space. This, in turn, allows a larger range of multipliers (relative to the counterparts
in tables 9, 10,a n d11). The prior speciﬁcation appears to be most informative about multipliers
over longer horizons.
Tables 15, 16,a n d17 list the median and 95% intervals for present value output, consumption,
and investment multipliers, respectively, generated under the passive monetary, active ﬁscal policy
regime. In the baseline New Keynesian model without sticky wages (the ﬁrst row of tables 15,
16,a n d17), there is a positive probability of short-run output multipliers being less than one
and short-run consumption and investment multipliers being negative. However, across all model
speciﬁcations, there is a substantial probability of large output multipliers, coupled with positive
consumption and investment multipliers.
C.2 Model Comparisons We assume that the multipliers from data follow uniform distribu-
tions and use the distributions in Caldara (2011). Caldara (2011) shows the impact multiplier varies
dramatically with the output elasticity of spending. We restrict the range for the elasticity to be be-
tween -0.7 and 0.7, implying the following distributions for impact multipliers: ΔY
ΔG ∼ U[−0.7,1.49],
ΔC
ΔG ∼ U[−0.48,0.26], and ΔI
ΔG ∼ U[−0.21,0.1]. We calculate the mean impact multiplier implied
from these distributions and compare how likely our model speciﬁcations can reproduce these values
(that is, we calculate p(ω|Aj)f o re a c hm o d e lAj). Tables 18 and 19 give the model comparisons
for the baseline and uniform priors, respectively. Various model speciﬁcations are better at match-
ing diﬀerent multipliers. For instance, although models 1 and 2 match the mean output impact
multiplier better than model 5, they are worse at producing the mean investment impact multiplier.
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C.3 Alternative Model Ordering Table 20 lists the median and 95% intervals for present
value output multipliers generated using an alternative ordering of the ﬁve models presented in the
main text. As noted in Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007), non-savers are vital for multipliers
when coupled with nominal wage rigidities. To explore the eﬀects of non-savers, we consider an
alternative ordering of models. Model 1 is a standard RBC closed-economy model. Model 2 adds
non-savers to the standard RBC closed-economy framework15. Model 3 additionally allows for
real frictions (investment adjustment costs, habit formation, and capacity utilization). Model 4
is a standard NK model with sticky prices and wages, which introduces a role for monetary-ﬁscal
policy interactions. And model 5 allows for an open-economy structure. Note that models 1 and 5
are the same as the models presented in the main text. Table 20 reveals that non-savers have no
substantial impact on multipliers when the labor market is perfectly competitive.
15Since there are no sticky wages in this framework, both non-savers and savers make a intra-temporal labor-leisure
decision given the market wage rate



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model 1: Basic RBC 13.19 2.25 -5.44
Model 2: Real Frictions 15.19 0.55 -0.38
Model 3: NK Sticky Price 11.27 2.47 0.18
Model 4: NK Nonsavers 7.02 0.20 -0.05
Table 18: Log Bayes factors in favor of each model over model 5 (open economy with G nontraded),










Model 1: Basic RBC 0.46 1.01 -4.71
Model 2: Real Frictions 2.35 0.80 -0.14
Model 3: NK Sticky Price 0.74 1.29 0.10
Model 4: NK Nonsavers 0.17 -0.07 -0.07
Table 19: Log Bayes factors in favor of each model over model 5 (open economy with G nontraded),
for various impact multipliers with uniform priors.
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